Women as Outsiders: A Growing Diversity in Public Opinion by Clark, Cal & Clark, Janet
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 22 Number 1 Article 1 
November 1994 
Women as Outsiders: A Growing Diversity in Public Opinion 
Cal Clark 
Janet Clark 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Clark, Cal and Clark, Janet (1994) "Women as Outsiders: A Growing Diversity in Public Opinion," Journal of 
Political Science: Vol. 22 : No. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol22/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
WOMEN AS OUTSIDERS: A 
GROWING DIVERSITY IN 
PUBLIC OPINION 
Cal Clark, Auburn University 
Janet Clark, West Georgia College 
Women may be regarded as outsiders in American politics for 
several intersecting reasons. First, and perhaps most obviously, they 
remain woefully underrepresented among the political elites in the 
United States . Even after the "Year of the Woman" in the 1992 
national elections, for example, women held only about a tenth of the 
seats in Congress -- one of the lowest rates among advanced industrial 
societies -- and a fifth in the state legislatures (Cook et al, 1994; Darcy 
et. al. , 1987). Second, at least until the 1980s, women participated in 
mass political activities (e.g., voting) at somewhat lower rates than 
men did (Baxter and Lansing, 1980; Clark and Clark, 1986; Welch, 
1977). These two indicators of being "outside the central polity," in 
tum, were explained by a more fundamental third factor -- gender role 
socialization that oriented women to passive and home-oriented 
activities. Social trends during the 1970s and 1980s altered this picture 
somewhat The rise of the women's movement and women's increasing 
entrance into the workforce eroded many barriers that traditional values 
and socialization patterns had created (Elshtain, 1981; Klein, 1984; 
Sapiro, 1983; Sinclair, 1983). As a result, gender differences in mass 
political participation narrowed greatly; and the number of women in 
office increased gradually but, in cumulative terms, quite impressively 
(Baxter and Lansing, 1980; Darcy et al, 1987). 
The attenuation of the first three facets of women's status as 
political outsiders was accompanied, perhaps paradoxically, by the 
growth of a fourth aspect. This was the "gender gap" that emerged for 
the first time in voting and issue attitudes during the 1980s. 
Previously, there had been little difference in the political preferences of 
men and women on most substantive issues. Following the election of 
Ronald Reagan, women began to take more liberal positions on a wide 
variety of issues and to vote in a more liberal manner than men 
(Bendyna and Lake, 1994; Clark and Clark, 1993 & 1994; Kenski, 
1988; Mueller, 1988; Poole and Zeigler, 1985; Stoper, 1989). The 
conventional explanation for this was that, as they became more aware 
of political life, women began to apply distinctively feminine values, 
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such as compassion and a stress on interpersonal relations, to the 
political sphere in what might be termed a rise in "gender 
consciousness" (Carroll, 1982; Conover, 1988; Gilligan, 1982; Klein, 
1984; Rinehart, 1992). The growing prominence of the gender gap, 
however, diverted attention from the fact that the gap between 
traditional women and feminists was growing as well, as denoted by the 
surprising lack of a gender gap on abortion and the Equal Rights 
Amendment (Sears and Ruddie, 1990; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986), 
suggesting that both groups of women might be considered as 
outsiders. 
Thus, by the early 1990s, public opinion data provided several 
pieces of evidence that women remained outsiders in U.S. politics and 
that several disparate groups might qualify for this rubric. With public 
opinion data from the 1992 National Election Survey conducted by the 
University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, this paper tests 
the hypothesis that women are still outsiders. We begin by examining 
the gender gap on alienation from the political system, general 
ideological positions, and a sampling of issues concerning women -- all 
of which would be expected to manifest feelings of women as outsiders. 
The absence of a gender gap on a central woman's issue, abortion, is 
then explored in more detail to suggest a more nuanced portrayal of 
women as outsiders. Finally, the initial findings are refined by 
comparisons of several groups of women who would be expected to 
hold differing political perspectives. Overall, the image of women as 
political outsiders is confirmed; and several separate types of 
"outsidedness" emerge from the analysis. 
The Gender Gap on Alienation, Ideology, and Women's 
Issues 
If women are truly outsiders in the American polity, one would 
expect them to be disproportionately alienated from their government, 
liberal in a time of conservative (Reagan-Bush) administrations, and 
sensitive to issues concerning women's socioeconomic and political 
status. Data on all these dimensions are presented in Tables I through 
5 where the gender gap is the simple difference between the percentage 
of women and men holding a particular attitude. A positive gender gap 
shows that women are more likely to state a belief than men, while a 
negative one indicates that an idea is more prevalent among men. 
Several aspects of the data on political alienation are consistent 
with the women as outsiders hypothesis, but overall the results lend 
only partial support to this theory. Except for expressing a general 
patriotism, women appeared quite disgruntled. They did not believe that 
the U.S. was going in the right direction or that the economy was 
improving; they were quite cynical about the government's competence, 
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honesty, and responsiveness; they did not appear particularly active or 
efficacious in political life; and less than half trusted people in general . 
In short, taken by themselves, they had all the characteristics of 
political outsiders. Yet, these data are far from completely supportive 
of the women as outsiders hypothesis which presumes that they are 
disadvantaged relative to men. If this were so, women should be 
significantly more alienated than men. In direct contrast, except for the 
efficacy items (where a negative gap of 10% to 15% shows that 
women's gains in mass participation have yet to translate into full 
equality in participatory attitudes), the gender gap is fairly marginal. 
Thus, women's political alienation does not appear to be much different 
from men's. 
The gender gap is generally consistent with the image of women as 
outsiders for almost all the items concerning ideology (Tables 2, 3, and 
4). Table 2 presents the results of a "feeling thermometer" with a scale 
of O to I 00 (50 indicates neutral feelings) that respondents were asked to 
apply to individuals and groups. It reports the percentage of the 
population that had positive feelings toward a political figure or group, 
as indicated by giving them a score of 60 or above. Perhaps the most 
striking aspect of these data is that few of these groups are perceived 
positively by as little as half the population. Again, as with the 
alienation data, Americans clearly were in a sour mood in November 
1992. 
Table 2 shows that in 1992 women felt more positively toward 
Bill Clinton, liberals, the federal government and Congress, 
environmentalists, the poor and welfare recipients, and less positively 
toward George Bush and conservatives. As would be expected, women 
had more positive feelings than men toward the women's movement 
(49% to 38%) and feminists (31% to 27%), although these fairly low 
percentages for even women indicate the cleavage between feminists and 
traditional women noted above. Women also almost invariably had 
similar warmer feelings, in the 5% to 10% range, toward the wide 
variety of social groups included in the table. Since most of these 
groups are minorities, this finding implies a sympathy toward fellow 
outsiders. Finally, in a somewhat similar vein, women were more 
appreciative of police and lawyers than men, suggesting that women 
may feel more vulnerable as outsiders and, thus, more in need of the 
protection offered by these two sources. 
The image of women as more liberal than men is confirmed by the 
data on general ideological positions in Table 3 and on spending 
priorities in Table 4. In terms of ideological and partisan self-image, 
women were 8% less likely than men to identify themselves as 
Republicans and as conservatives (approximately 37% to 45% each). 
Women were more supportive than men (generally in the range of 10% 
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Table 1 
GENDER GAP IN ALIENATION FROM THE POLITY 
Male Female Gender 
Gap 
SatisfactiQn with 
CQnditiQns in U.S. 
Love U.S. 90% 88% -2% 
U.S. going in right direction 20% 15% -5% 
National economy better 6% 4% -2% 
Personal finances better 34% 27% -7% 
Trust Qf GQvemment 
Trust govt most of time 28% 30% 2% 
Govt doesn't care about people 53% 52% -1% 
People have no say in govt 35% 36% 1% 
Government wastes money 72% 65% -7% 
Govt run for big interests 79% 78% -1% 
US Reps good district contacts 75% 76% 1% 
Efficacy and Activism 
Active in community 22% 22% 0% 
Interest in govt & politics 75% 62% -13% 
Politics too complex to 
understand all the time 60% 73% 13% 
Understand political issues 80% 72% -8% 
Better informed than most on pols 42% 27% -15% 
Can do a good job in office 42% 26% -16% 
Well qualified for politics 48% 37% -11% 
General Alienation 
Trust people 49% 42% -7% 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election 
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research . Reprinted with 
permission . 
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Table 2 
GENDER GAP ON FEELING TIIERMOMETERS 
(in percentage of scores over 60 on a scale of O - 100) 
Male Female Gender 
Gap 
Politicians 
George Bush 40% 36% -4% 
Bill Clinton 47% 52% 5% 
Ross Perot 30% 28% -2% 
Politi1,;al Id~logi~s 
Conservatives 31% 26% -5% 
Liberals 19% 26% 7% 
Politi1,;al Institutions 
Federal Government 18% 23% 5% 
Congress 19% 26% 7% 
Military 63% 61% -2% 
Police 59% 64% 5% 
Politi1,;al In~r~sts 
Big Business 29% 29% 0% 
Unions 31% 29% -2% 
Environmentalists 53% 59% 6% 
Lawyers 18% 29% 11% 
Wom~n·s Qrouus 
Feminists 27% 31% 4% 
The Women's Movement 38% 49% 11% 
Pot~ntial Publi1.; S~rvi~ R~i11i~n1s 
Poor 55% 64% 9% 
Welfare Recipients 19% 23% 4% 
Volume 22, 1994 I 5 
Clark and Clark 
Table 2 (continued) 
Male Female Gender 
Gap 
Six;ial QrQUQ~ 
Catholics 44% 48% 4% 
Fundamentalists 27% 30% 3% 
Jews 43% 49% 6% 
Whites 57% 64% 7% 
Blacks 41% 52% 11% 
Hispanics 35% 42% 7% 
Asians 31% 38% 7% 
Southerners 45% 49% 4% 
Immigrants 33% 33% 0% 
Illegal Immigrants 7% 9% 2% 
Gays 10% 18% 8% 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election 
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with 
permission. 
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Table 3 
GENDER GAP ON IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES, 1992 
Male Female Gender 
Gap 
Idoology 
Conservative 45% 37% -8% 
Republican 44% 36% -8% 
Roi~ of Qov~mm~nt 
Government should expand 55% 70% 15% 
Govt should become more powerful 29% 44% 15% 
Strong govt over free market 64% 76% 12% 
Govt involved in what people 
should do for themselves 45% 31% -14% 
Increase services vs. cut spending 32% 42% 10% 
Govt provide health insurance 49% 54% 5% 
Govt guarantee job and standard 
of living 26% 34% 8% 
Government provide child care 56% 65% 9% 
Willing to pay more taxes 29% 31% 2% 
Eguru Rights Commitm~nt 
All should have equal rights 91% 91% 0% 
Too much emphasis on equal rights 
in US 46% 45% -1% 
Support govt on school 
integration 40% 50% 10% 
Domesti~ Viol~nQ~ Issu~s 
Favor death penalty 86% 71% -15% 
Draft avoiders right 47% 55% 8% 
Police vs social services to 
control urban unrest 29% 21% -8% 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election 
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with 
permission. 
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Table 4 
GENDER GAP ON FEDERAL SPENDING 
Increase social security spending 
Increase spending for poor 
Increase spending for homeless 
Increase child care spending 
Increase AIDS spending 
Increase public school spending 
Increase college aid 
Increase spending on unemployed 
Increase spending for Blacks 
Increase spending for cities 
Increase welfare spending 
Increase food stamp spending 
Increase spending on crime 
Increase defense spending 
Increase environmental spending 
Male 
41% 
48% 
68% 
44% 
61% 
62% 
59% 
35% 
23% 
21% 
13% 
15% 
67% 
20% 
59% 
Female 
55% 
61% 
77% 
56% 
63% 
69% 
61% 
44% 
27% 
21% 
21% 
21% 
73% 
19% 
63% 
Gender 
Gap 
14% 
13% 
9% 
12% 
2% 
7% 
2% 
9% 
4% 
0% 
8% 
6% 
6% 
-1% 
4% 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election 
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with 
permission. 
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Table 5 
GENDER GAP ON WOMEN'S ISSUES 
Male 
Women equal role in bus 
and govt vs. stay at home 75% 
Women should form groups vs. 
act on own 53% 
Sexual harassment serious 
problem 25% 
Pro- Choice 46% 
High interest in women's issues 77% 
Pride in women's achievements 61% 
Anger at women's treatment 61% 
Female 
75% 
64% 
38% 
46% 
80% 
72% 
63% 
Gender 
Gap 
0% 
11% 
13% 
0% 
3% 
11% 
2% 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election 
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with 
permission. 
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to 15%) of expanding the role and powers of government, presumably 
because they believed that redistributive policies were necessary to help 
them and other marginal groups in society. The data on preferences for 
increased spending in Table 4 demonstrate that women were generally 
more favorable than men by 5% to 15% toward increased spending in a 
wide variety of liberal areas, as well as for fighting crime (again 
suggesting their greater concern with protection). Finally (returning 
briefly to Table 3), women were more supportive of school integration 
and more opposed to "domestic violence" than men, although there was 
no gender gap on the subject of "equal rights" at least in the abstract 
(90% of Americans expressed a commitment to equal rights, but near 
majorities thought that the U.S. was now placing equal emphasis upon 
them). 
One would certainly expect a considerable gender gap on women's 
issues . For example, the "thermometer" data in Table 2 showed that 
women felt significantly more positively toward the women's 
movement and feminists than did men. The results in Table 5, then, 
are somewhat surprising since a significant gender gap emerges on only 
three of the seven items -- women were 11 % to 13% more likely than 
men to say that sexual harassment was a serious problem, that women 
should form groups instead of acting individually, and that they felt 
pride in women's achievements. On three other items, there was a 
surprising consensus of approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of 
both men and women who expressed interest in women's issues, anger 
at the way that some women were treated, and the belief that women 
and men should have an equal role in business and government (as 
opposed to staying home). While a cynic might note greater male 
commitment to more abstract and symbolic issues, as opposed to the 
more concrete issues of feminism and women's organizing to increase 
their power, this generally strong support for women's equality is 
consistent with long-term secular shifts in American public opinion 
toward greater support for equality in gender relationships (Mayer, 
1992). 
The Abortion Issue: Two Sets of Women Outsiders 
Perhaps the most surprising finding in Table 5 is that 46% of both 
men and women professed a pro-choice opinion on abortion, generally 
viewed as the most central "woman's issue" of the 1980s and 1990s. In 
actuality, though, this "non-gender gap" continues a trend dating back 
to the 1970s in which the opposition of women with traditional values 
to the Equal Rights Amendment and abortion have pulled down 
women 's overall level of support for these issues to or even slightly 
below that of men (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). 
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In the 1992 elections, moreover, this effect explained why the 
gender gap in the presidential vote was more muted than in the 1980s. 
Compared to men, women were 5% more likely to vote for Clinton, 
1 % less likely to vote for Bush, and 4% less likely to vote for Perot 
(Bendyna and Lake, 1994; Pomper et al, 1993). In contrast to 1988 
when views on abortion were unassociated with presidential vote 
(despite Bush's pro-life and Dukakis' pro-choice positions), Table 6 
demonstrates that abortion had a significant impact on the 1992 vote. 
For example, Bill Clinton ran 20% better among pro-choice than 
among pro-life voters (58% to 38%), while George Bush enjoyed a 25% 
advantage among pro-lifers (47% to 22%). Controlling for position on 
abortion, Table 7 indicates that this new impact of abortion on 
presidential vote did indeed attenuate the observed gender gap for the 
population as a whole. As for the electorate as a whole, there is almost 
no gender gap for George Bush among either pro-life or pro-choice 
voters. However, in both these subgroups women were approximately 
10% more likely than men to support Clinton (62% to 52% for pro-
choice voters and 44% to 33% for pro-life voters) -- approximately 
double the gender gap for the population as a whole. Thus, the 
increased salience of the abortion issue in 1992 attenuated the gender 
gap by diverting the votes of some pro-life women who nonnally 
would have voted for Clinton to Bush or Perot and, to a presumably 
lesser extent, some pro-choice women to Clinton. 
The abortion issue in 1992, therefore, clearly tapped the alienation 
from a prime women's issue of women with traditional values. This 
argues for a closer examination of what types of women took a pro-life 
position. Table 8 presents the crosstabulations, for women respondents 
only, between beliefs on abortion and seven potential explanatory 
variables: views toward fundamentalists and liberals (as indicated by a 
score of 60 or higher on the feeling thermometer), income, education, 
age, and whether the respondent was a feminist or a homemaker. Table 
9 then presents a multivariate analysis of variance to ascertain the 
combined impact of the significant factors on a woman's taking a pro-
life or pro-choice position, as well as each individual predictor's 
independent contribution to the "explained variance" in the dependent 
variable. 
As would be expected, a positive feeling toward fundamentalists 
has a very strong impact on a woman's position on abortion. For 
example, 70% of the women who liked fundamentalists were pro-life, 
while only 37% of the women who had less positive feelings toward 
fundamentalists took a pro-life stance. There were also moderate 
tendencies for women who liked liberals, were highly educated, and 
came from more affluent families to be more pro-choice than those with 
the opposite characteristics. Feminists (self-identified) were 12% more 
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Table 6 
RELATIONSHIP BE1WEEN VIEWS ON ABORTION 
AND 1992 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE 
Pro-life* Pro-choice** 
Clinton 38% 58% 
Bush 47% 22% 
Perot 15% 20% 
Cramer's V = .26 Stat1st1cal sig = .001 
* Abortion should never be permitted, or only for rape and incest (37% 
of Americans) . 
** Abonion should always be permitted (46% of Americans) . 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election 
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with 
permission. 
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Table 7 
GENDER GAP ON VOTING CONTROLLING 
FOR POSITION ON ABORTION 
PRO-LIFE* 
Men Women 
Clinton 33% 44% 
Bush 48% 46% 
Perot 20% 11% 
Cramer's V = .14 Stat1sucal s1g = .002 
PRO-CHOICE** 
Men Women 
Clinton 52% 62% 
Bush 22% 22% 
Perot 26% 16% 
Cramer's V = .13 Statistical sig = .002 
* Abortion should never be permitted, or only for rape and incest (37% 
of Americans). 
** Abortion should always be permitted (46% of Americans). 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election 
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with 
permission. 
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likely than nonfeminists (63% to 51 %) to be pro-choice. While this 
difference is in the expected direction, it is considerably less than might 
have been expected, indicating that moral beliefs crosscut those about 
women's status. Finally, homemakers and women over 55 were 
slightly more pro-life than non-homemakers and younger women. The 
analysis of variance shows that in combination these independent 
variables have a moderate impact on women's views about abortion in 
the United States (the Eta squared of .22 is equivalent to an R2 of .22 
and R of .47 in multiple regression). The relative influence of these 
predictions is generally consistent with the results in the bivariate 
tables -- fundamentalism and education are fairly strong, while 
liberalism, feminism, and income are weak but still significant (age and 
homemaker status were not significant). 
These results imply that the political processes in America in the 
early 1990s have created two distinctive sets of women "outsiders." On 
the one hand, the changing socioeconomic conditions had made many 
women more liberal on a wide variety of issues concerning social 
compassion. On the other, the moral beliefs of many women alienated 
them from the mainstream of the women's movement with its pro-
choice philosophy. While many of the women in this second set were 
religious fundamentalists and fell into low income and low education 
categories, the surprisingly weak correlation between feminism and 
support for the pro-choice position certainly indicates that the 
stereotype of pro-choice feminism is overdrawn and that the women's 
movement may be alienating some potential supporters. For example, 
while most feminists have positive feelings toward the women's 
movement, as would certainly be expected, almost a quarter (22%) do 
not. 
Attitude Differences Among Women: Types of Outsiders 
The discussion of attitudes about abortion in the previous section 
confirms the suggestion that there are at least two distinct groups of 
women political outsiders. This section explores the question of 
different types of women outsiders more systematically through two 
types of data analysis. The first compares the attitudes of several 
groups of women, some of whom would be presumed to be liberal and 
some conservative, on representative items concerning economic and 
women's issues. To the extent that their predicted ideological variations 
emerge, our basic hypothesis about women as outsiders should be 
supported. In addition, though, some deviations from these predictions 
might also be suggestive about distinctive subgroups that merit being 
termed outsiders. Second, the width of the gender gap within these 
groups will also be examined to test whether several types of presumed 
outsiders display the predicted attitude patterns. 
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Table 8 
RELA TIONSIDPS BE1WEEN ABORTION BELIEFS 
AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AMONG WOMEN 
POSITIVE VIEW OF FUNDAMENTALISTS 
No Yes 
Pro-life 37% 70% 
Pro-choice 63% 30% 
Gamma = -.60 Statistical sig = .001 
FEMINIST 
No Yes 
Pro-life 49% 37% 
Pro-choice 51% 63% 
Gamma = .24 Statistical sig = .01 
HOMEMAKER 
No Yes 
Pro-life 44% 54% 
Pro-choice 56% 46% 
Gamma= -.20 Statistical sig = .05 
POSITIVE VIEW OF LIBERALS 
No Yes 
Pro-life 50% 31% 
Pro-choice 50% 68% 
Gamma= .37 Statistical sig = .001 
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Table 8 (continued) 
EDUCATION 
G~ Some High Some College 
School High School College 
School 
Pro-life 76% 69% 51% 37% 23% 
Pro-choice 24% 31% 49% 62% 77% 
Gamma= .47 Statistical sig = .001 
INCOME 
Uncb' $15,000- $35,000- Over 
$15,000 $35,000 $50,000 $50,000 
Pro-life 61% 41% 43% 27% 
Pro-choice 39% 59% 57% 73% 
Gamma = .36 Statistical sig = .001 
AGE 
Under35 35-55 Over 55 
Pro-life 44% 43% 52% 
Pro-choice 56% 57% 48% 
Cramer's V = .14 Statistical sig = .001 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election 
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with 
permission. 
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Table9 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE EXPLAINING 
POSITION ON ABORTION AMONG WOMEN 
Eta Squared 
Individual Effects 
Like fundamentalists 
Education 
Like liberals 
Feminist 
Family income 
TOTAL 
.22 
% Explained SS (Variance) 
10.5% 
6.7% 
1.9% 
1.8% 
1.4% 
22.3% 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election 
Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with 
permission. 
Eight representative items from Tables 2 through 5 were selected 
for this analysis of women's issues -- positive attitude towards women 
groups, belief that women should have an equal role in business and 
government, and pro-choice views -- and of ideological and economic 
issues -- positive feelings toward Bill Clinton, a desire for government 
to increase services rather than cut taxes, and support for increasing 
spending on the poor, child care, and social security. The views of 
different subgroups of women on these eight issues were then compared 
to the percentage of all women holding an attitude in Table 10. 
The first set of comparisons concerns indicators of a woman's 
status and philosophical orientation -- whether or not she was a 
feminist, a homemaker, or had a positive view of fundamentalists . 
Obviously, the former should have liberal attitudes; and the latter two 
conservative ones. Additionally, one would expect that the these 
differences to be more marked on women's issues than on economic 
ones. A second set concerns ideological orientations or socioeconomic 
characteristics closely associated with ideology -- whether a woman 
identified herself as a conservative or a liberal and whether she belonged 
to a minority group. Such ideological differences should hold over both 
economic and women's issues (except, perhaps, for minorities who 
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might focus on "bread and butter" concerns). A third comparison 
involves social class orientations as indicated by education, a college 
degree versus no more than a grade school education (almost exactly the 
same figures result from comparing those with family incomes over 
$50,000 to those with under $15,000). Here, the attitudinal differences 
should be greater on economic than women's issues; in fact, upper class 
women might well be expected to be more concerned with women's 
issues than working class ones. Our final comparison focuses upon age 
cohorts -- women under 35 and over 55. Younger women should be 
more liberal on both sets of issues with the possible exception of social 
security spending which is obviously of special concern to the elderly. 
Our basic hypotheses about ideological differences are essentially 
confirmed by the data in Table 10, although several significant and 
suggestive exceptions exist. Feminists were quite liberal on the 
women's issues (with the exception of their limited liberalism on 
abortion discussed previously) and in support of Clinton while only 
moderately so on the four directly economic issues . In contrast, 
homemakers and fundamentalists were conservative on women's roles 
and abortion, quite so in the case of the fundamentalists' rejection of the 
pro-choice position. However, they differed little from women in 
general in their views on economic issues , Clinton, and even the 
women 's movement. These surprising findings have two important 
implications . First , being a homemaker no longer seems to reinforce 
traditional socialization except in a couple of areas closely linked to a 
homemaker's social status and self-respect. Second, given the 
comparatively low socioeconomic status of many fundamentalists (e.g., 
31 % of women who liked fundamentalists had a grade school education 
or less, more than double the 14% of those who did not) their moderate 
stance on many issues may reflect an awareness of vulnerability which, 
in tum, makes them sensitive to the potential benefits of government 
assistance and organizing self-help groups. 
The predicted differences among liberal, conservative, and minority 
women emerge quite well; and, as hypothesized, these variations are 
generally high for both economic and women's issues. One interesting 
exception to this general rule is that neither liberals nor conservatives 
deviate much from the average for all women on social security, an 
issue that once was at the core of ideological divisions in the U.S. 
Perhaps, this reflects social security's acceptance as an "entitlement" or 
"middle class welfare." Likewise, younger women were more liberal 
than older ones on almost all these issues as well. This is consistent 
with the theory of changing generational socialization, although the fact 
that the "age gap" is particularly wide on child care spending and narrow 
on social security hints at a bit of generational special interest as well. 
The presumption that less educated women would be much more liberal 
on the economic issues holds true except for child care spending which 
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college graduates want increased more than those with grade school 
educations by a significant margin (61% to 51%). This suggests the 
special needs of another group of outsiders -- women pursuing 
professional careers who do not wish to be shunted off to a "mommy 
track" (Clark and Clark, 1994 present data showing that many of these 
women fonn a group distinct from feminists). Conversely, college 
educated women are much more liberal than grade school educated ones 
on women's issues, confinning that education is an important agent of 
"countersocialization" (Fowlkes, 1983). Also regarding education, the 
association of low education with a prolife position accounts for 
minority women having a slightly conservative position on abortion 
when a liberal one would be expected (multiple table analysis not 
presented in paper). 
When one looks at how the gender gap varies among groups of 
women, it is also possible to provide a more sophisticated test of the 
hypothesis that women are more "compassionate" than by simply 
detennining if women in general are more liberal on social issues than 
men. In essence, the compassion hypothesis argues that women who 
would normally be expected to be conservative will support aiding the 
disadvantaged out of compassion . Since poor women would nonnally 
be expected to take such a position out of self interest, the problem 
arises of how to separate "compassion" from "self interest." If it is 
assumed that both men and women who are economically distressed 
will take liberal positions on government roles and spending policies, 
then one would expect that the gender gap should be significantly wider 
among more affluent than less affluent groups . In the fonner instance , 
compassion would pull women away from men's normal attitudes, 
while in the latter both men and women would be pulled in the same 
direction by self-interest. Similarly, the gender gap should be much 
greater among conservatives than liberals since most liberals should be 
pro-government, while compassion should pull women away from 
conservatives ' anti-government inclinations. 
The data in Table 11 strongly support this perspective. As 
predicted, the gender gap is much greater for conservatives than for 
liberals, for college-educated women than for grade-school educated 
ones, and, to a slightly lesser extent, for high-income than for low-
income women. Thus, the compassion often attributed to women 's 
gender consciousness (Gilligan , 1982; Rinehart , 1992; Shapiro and 
Mahajan, 1986) evidently exists even where it would not particularly be 
expected, thus providing much stronger support for this perspective 
than could be derived by simply comparing men and women. 
Comparing the gender gap between generations can also provide an 
interesting test of the conflicting implications of the generational 
socialization and countersocialization perspectives. The first argues that 
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Table 10 
COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF SUBGROUPS OF WOMEN 
Like Women More Spend Spend Spend 
Women F.qual Pro Like Govt More More More 
Movmt Role Choice Clinton Servs Poor Child Cr Soc Sec 
All Women 49% 75% 46% 52% 42% 61% 56% 55% 
Feminists 78% 85% 55% 70% 49% 69% 67% 56% 
Homemakers 49% 65% 39% 47% 40% 61% 52% 54% 
Fundaments 57% 63% 26% 51% 35% 60% 54% 58% 
Minority 71% 72% 42% 66% 62% 81% 74% 74% 
Liberal 73% 91% 74% 78% 61% 76% 75% 52% 
Conservative 34% 55% 27% 37% 30% 48% 40% 55% 
College 58% 87% 67% 52% 38% 48% 61% 38% 
Grade Sch 53% 52% 21% 57% 52% 74% 51% 74% 
Under 35 54% 84% 50% 52% 51% 63% 71% 57% 
Over 55 43% 63% 40% 53% 30% 57% 39% 51% 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by 
the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with permission. 
Table 11 
COMPARISON OF GENDER GAPS IN THE ATTITUDES OF SUBGROUPS OF AMERICANS 
Like Women More Spend Spend Spend 
Women F.qual Pro Like Govt More More More 
Movmt Role Choice Clinton Servs Poor Child Cr Soc Sec 
Population 11% 0% 0% 5% 10% 13% 12% 14% 
Liberal 7% -4% 4% -3% 3% 6% 4% 8% 
Conservatives 13% -7% 2% 18% 12% 21% 16% 18% 
College 22% 5% 13% 9% 13% 10% 20% 14% 
Grade School -3% 0% -12% -3% 1% 6% 3% 19% 
Low Income* 2% -1% -6% -7% 12% 13% 6% 10% 
High Income• 6% 7% 12% 6% 7% 10% 16% 11% 
Under 35 18% 6% 1% 7% 16% 8% 21% 15% 
Over 55 -2% -2% 5% 1% 0% 9% 4% 9% 
*Low income: family income under $15,000. 
High income: family income over $50,000. 
SOURCE: Computed from the data from the 1992 National Election Study of the Survey Research Center, distributed by 
the lnteruniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Reprinted with permission. 
Clark and Clark 
the vastly changed nature of American society between the 1950s and 
1970s means that all younger Americans are receiving different 
socialization experiences. If this is true, men as well as women under 
35 should be much more liberal than older generations; and there is 
little reason to suppose that the gender gap would vary greatly among 
generations. In contrast, countersocialization theory would argue that 
women have to take special advantage of opportunities for obtaining 
countersocialization, such as increased access to higher education and 
more liberal cultural norms. Thus, it would predict that the expansion 
of these opportunities in the 1970s and 1980s should have created a 
comparatively wide gender gap within the younger generation. On this 
question, the data in Table 11 are unambiguous as the gender gap is 
significantly wider among those under 35 than among those over 55 for 
six of the eight items. Thus, the younger generation of educated 
women seemingly constitute another group of political outsiders in the 
sense that their expectations have clearly outrun the attitudes of their 
male peers. 
Imp lie a tions 
This paper has used the evidence of American public opinion in 
1992 to examine the theory that women in the United States can be 
regarded as a group of "political outsiders." The raw data on the gender 
gap were generally consistent with this analysis. Moreover, a more 
detailed probing of women's opinions indicated that there is not just a 
single group of outsiders -- well-educated, liberal feminists. Rather 
there is a ring of "outsider" groups with interests that both overlap and 
crosscut each other --liberal feminists, women pursuing professional 
careers who are not necessarily feminists, the new generation of women 
college graduates, women with blue and pink collar jobs and many 
minority women who respond to traditional liberal "bread and butter" 
issues, women with traditional values on such issues as abortion, and 
(although their distinct attitudes were not isolated in this analysis) 
destitute women. 
Contemporary analysis of these differences usually does not go 
beyond the conflict between feminists and traditional women. However, 
this more complex picture might be advantageous for starting a process 
of identifying overlapping interests among some of the subgroups. For 
example, many traditional women share financial worries with blue 
collar women; professional women and feminists have shared interests 
on many women's issues; and so forth. This process could be vital 
because, if these groups of outsiders remain disunited and working at 
cross purposes, their shared status as outsiders is likely to continue. 
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